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Overview: Real Time Safety Monitoring and 
Prediction of Unsafe Events in the National 
Airspace
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Motivation
• National Airspace System (NAS) ensures safety through rules, regulations, and response procedures
• Air traffic in the NAS projected to increase in the near future
• Advanced decision-making tools required to maintain the current level of NAS safety
• Optimal decisions require knowledge of both current and future state of the NAS
• At present, different stakeholders of NAS (e.g., pilots, flight controllers) rely on their situational awareness to 
make informed decisions to avoid unsafe events
• Consolidate information from disparate sources
• Apply their domain knowledge to interpret current and forecast 
NAS state
• Interact with multiple independent tools and mentally integrate 
the information
• Uncertainty is typically not handled in a formal and 
rigorous manner
• Safety assessment tools typically focus on a few threats
• Their assessments mostly independent of other threats
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Research Goals
• Develop a framework to
• Provide real-time assessment (nowcast and forecast) of safety and 
risk 
• Predict evolution of safety so as to help operators avoid unsafe states 
instead of needing to mitigate them
• Holistic framework 
• Combines multiple threats to safety and considers their potential 
interactions
• Integrates disparate data sources
• Incorporates multiple sources of uncertainty into the predictions
• Our solution - the Real-Time Safety Modeling (RTSM) 
framework
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Approach
• Safety Analysis & Modeling
– What are the hazards to safe flight?
– What unsafe events can occur?
– Which hazards/events occur most frequently?
• Real-Time Safety Monitoring
– How do we define “safety” and “risk” in the 
NAS?
– How do we measure/quantify it?
– How do we estimate the current state?
• Safety/Risk Prediction
– Which unsafe events are likely to occur in the 
future, if no corrective action is taken?
– What do different NAS users need to be aware 
of?
Monitoring
Prediction
NAS
Flight tracks, flight plans, 
weather, etc.
Estimate of current state 
of NAS safety, risk 
estimates
Future state of NAS 
safety, unsafe event 
prediction
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Safety Analysis
• Identify hazards that 
compromise safety by analyzing 
reports from several national 
incident and accident 
databases
– Generally categorize into 
airspace, human performance, 
and environmental categories
– Down-select hazards based on 
potential to model, monitor, and 
predict
• Identify unsafe events that 
result from hazards
NTSB ASRS FAA ……
Hazards
- Inoperative Navaid
- Excessive Communication
- Procedure Complexity
- Low Visibility
- Turbulence
- Icing
Events
- Loss of separation
- Evasive maneuvers
- Go around or rejected takeoff
- Unstable approach
- Convective weather encounter
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Definitions
• Unsafe event: An event/situation that compromises NAS safety or established 
safety standards
– Examples: loss of separation, loss of control, controlled flight into terrain, 
runway incursion, hard landing, tail strike, collision, etc.
• Hazard: A condition that potentially contributes to unsafe events
– Examples: convective weather, poor visibility, difficult terrain, etc.
• Safety metric: A quantitative measure of some aspect of safety of the NAS
– Examples: distance between two aircraft, distance between aircraft and 
convective weather region
• Safety threshold: Some limit on a safety metric or set of safety metrics
– Example: Enroute separation of 5 nautical miles
• Safety margin: “Distance” between current safety metric(s) and safety 
threshold(s)
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Safety Modeling
• What categories of events can occur?
• Loss of separation, wake vortex encounter, convective weather encounter, sector 
demand violation, etc.
• What conditions define the occurrence of the event?
• Defined as some function of the NAS state
• Example 1: Loss of separation between A1 and A2 occurs when the horizontal 
separation is less than 5 nautical miles and the vertical separation is less than 1000 ft
• Example 2: Sector demand is too high when the number of aircraft in a sector meets 
or exceeds the capacity limit
• How do we compute the safety margin w/r/t an event?
• Margin = {“distance” to event threshold}/threshold and expressed as a percentage
• Therefore, Margin is 0% when event is present
• How do we compute aggregate safety margins?
• Example: Average safety margins over all potential events
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Computational Architecture
NAS Monitoring Prediction
Inputs
Measured 
State
Hidden 
State 
Estimate
Safety 
Margin 
Values
Predicted State
Predicted Safety 
Margins
Predicted Times of 
Occurrence of 
Unsafe Events
Probability of Future 
Occurrence of 
Unsafe Events 
(in next x minutes)Computation can be distributed to 
different regions of the NAS and 
consolidated for system-level safety 
assessment
Model-based framework
• First principles models of NAS 
components (aircraft dynamics, 
weather, wake vortex, etc.)
• Safety metrics & thresholds
Set of 
Unscented 
Kalman Filters
Monte Carlo 
Prediction
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State space X
State 
x``(kh)
State x`(kh)
State x``(kh)
Loss of 
Separation 
A1-A2
Sector 
Demand 
Violation 
ZOA12
State 
x(ko)
Conceptual Framework
11
Distributed Computational Architecture 
12
Prediction
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Extension to Airport Surface Operations
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Motivation
“While commercial aviation has made extraordinary strides in safety, one area 
where risk remains is on the airport surface. The bottom line is planes 
shouldn’t run into each other in the air or on the ground.” 
- NTSB Spokesman
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Hazard Analysis
• Over 600 accident reports queried spanning multiple decades
• Flight phases: Standing, taxi, takeoff, and landing
• Locations: Ramp, taxiway, runway
• Databases: NTSB and ASRS primarily
• Results:
• Human factors primarily
• Weather Conditions
• Aircraft equipment
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NTSB ASRS Skybrary ……
Ground Incident Classification
• Predictable incidents:
• Can be measured, modeled, and predicted using real-time data  e.g. failure to 
maintain clearance from another aircraft during taxi → relevant data precursor, 
distance
• Unpredictable incidents:
• Cannot be measured, modeled, or predicted using the RTSM framework1 e.g. flight 
attendant tripping and falling
• Runway incursions by foreign object
• Failure to follow current operating standards and procedures
• Equipment failure such as nose landing gear separation
• Inadvertent throttle movement by flight crewmember 
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[1] NTSB Report No. ERA11CA010, CHI06LA016, NYC02LA042
[1] NTSB Report No. LAX05LA218
[1] NTSB Report No. NYC05LA043, CHI01LA066
[1] NTSB Report No. CHI99LA289, FTW99FA201, CHI93FA129 MIA99LA026
[1] NTSB Report No. ENG08IA042, CHI00FA244, CHI00LA296, LAX07IA191
[1] NTSB Report No. CEN11IA270
Predictable Incidents
• Aircraft - Aircraft Ground Collisions During Taxi
– Wingtip/Winglet impacts tail of adjacent aircraft
– Wingtips not visible from cockpit for certain transport a/c
• Collisions During Pushback
– Failure of tug driver to maintain clearance during 
pushback
– Lack of situational awareness, inadequate visual lookout, 
overestimation of proximity, & lack of communication 
between wing walker & tug operators
• Weather-Related Incidents1
– Ground contamination: Snow, ice, rain, slush
– Presence of deicers on taxiways & ramps
– Decreased visibility
[1] NTSB Report No. DCA09MA021
[1] NTSB Report No. ATL02LA029, CEN09LA093, NYC05LA038, NYC02LA056
[1] NTSB Report No. ATL04LA053, CHI08LA051
[1]NTSB Report No. DCA16CA070
[1] NTSB Report No. NYC06LA074, DCA14CA051, ANC07LA008, DEN06IA008, DEN05LA048
[1] NTSB Report No. DCA13CA035
[1] NTSB Report No. FTW02LA088, CHI06LA092, DFW07LA155
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Development of Safety Metrics
• Safety Metric (SM)
• SM Function Arguments
• SM Function Outputs
• Threshold Equations
• Required Data
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Safety Metrics
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Safety Metric (SM) Safety Metric Function Arguments Safety Metric Function Outputs Threshold Equation Example Required Data Examples
Weather at coordinate point of interest, time matrix of all weather categories
(e.g., precipitation,
wind, temperature, etc.)
and their relevant properties (e.g., type, direction, severity, persistence, etc.)
A threshold is needed for each
element of the matrix. Examples: thunderstorm.
began = :08, 
precipitation.type = ice_pellets.
Current weather; forecast weather
Surface visual range (SVR)  (aka visibility) point of interest, time, {weather at coordinate} Distance in feet SVR > 50 ft As required by “Weather at coordinate” SM
Ground services operating status Volume of interest, time matrix of all service categories
(e.g., lights,tracking coverage, runways, etc.) and operational status (e.g.,
Inoperative, nominal)
servicesOperatingStatus.asde_x = NOMINAL NOTAMs
Degree of taxi route normalcy {Airport configuration at time t}, {airport configuration at time 
t+5},{probability of ramp/taxiway/runway congestion}, {surface 
facilities operating status}, off-nominal ops (e.g., priority aircraft, etc.)
NOTAMs (Notice to Airmen) regarding closed 
taxiways, standard taxi routes, expected airport 
reconfiguration
Taxi complexity Taxi clearance, time, {weather at coordinate}, {degree of taxi route 
normalcy}
complexity category, e.g., low, medium, high taxiComplexity < MEDIUM Airport layout, location of hot spots, taxi clearance
Airport configuration at a given time time, {weather at coordinate} Runways in use, taxi routes in use Current and forecast weather, especially wind; airport 
layout; standard operating procedures; traffic 
forecasts
Risk of aircraft collision with 
aircraft/vehicle/structure
position, heading, and speed of ownship, position, heading and 
speed of other aircraft /vehicle/structure, {probability of ramp 
/taxiway/runway congestion}
nearest distance (ft), risk category, e.g., none, low,
medium, high
ProximityViolation = NONE Precise position and heading; aircraft type; winglet 
type; aircraft dimensions; weather; airport structures 
location and dimensions
Probability of ramp/taxiway/runway contamination Point of interest, time, {weather at coordinate} probability of all contamination
categories such as ice e.g., black
ice, slush, etc.; water; {FOD debris}; dead animals
rwyContamination.blackIce = 0 Current and forecast weather; PIREPs; runway 
condition reports;
Probability of vehicle loss of control on the ground 
(LOC-G)
point of interest, time, {probability of taxiway contamination}, {weather 
at coordinate}
risk category, e.g., none, low,
medium, high
VehicleLOCG <= LOW Current and forecast weather providing information 
about surface icing
Risk of drifting Foreign Object Debris (FOD-G) Point of interest, time, {weather at coordinate}, FOD at nearby 
coordinates
risk category, e.g., none, low, medium, high FODGRisk <= LOW FOD existence (e.g., camera-fed image recognition)
Risk of jet blast point of interest, time risk category, e.g., none, low, medium, high jetblastRisk <= LOW Precise position and heading of all operating aircraft
Probability of ramp/taxiway/runway congestion {airport configuration at a given time}, {weather at coordinate}, 
{aircraft at coordinate}
Comparison to expected congestion, i.e. low, normal, high probCongestion <= NORMAL Data required for the helper functions
Probability of pilot error during ground ops Pilot id, time, {taxi complexity}, {visibility conditions} probability in percentages pilotErrorProb < 10% Position and heading of aircraft, plus all the data 
required for the helper functions
Probability of controller error on ground ops Controller id, time, {Ground service operating status}, {taxi 
complexity},{Controller workload}
probability in percentages controllerErrorProb < 1% Data required for the helper functions
Airport Reconfiguration
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Motivation
• Runway configurations depend on current and predicted traffic demand, 
wind speed and direction coordinated between controllers, pilots, and 
ground personnel
• Can be disruptive and challenging for human decision makers
• Optimization methods do not systematically handle uncertainty associated 
with meteorological conditions, arrival & departure demands, and other 
variables
Approach: Markov Decision Process
22
Markov Decision Process Framework
• Markov Property: The effects of an action taken in one state depend only on 
that state and not on the prior history.
• An MDP model is a tuple (S, A, T, R):
• A set of possible states S
• A set of possible actions A
• A real valued reward function R(s, a)
• State Transition Probability Function, T
• Uncertainty in outcome after action is taken
• Goal: Generate optimal policy using tuple instead of static planning 
• Dynamic planning with multiple step look-ahead
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Reconfiguration Example
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MDP Elements for Runway Reconfiguration 
• Using landing crosswind 
limit of 20 knots and 
tailwind limit of 15 knots
• Zero degree north
• Assume transition outside 
of runway is deterministic
• Transition function on 
runway:i.e. probability of a 
landing or a missed 
approach → 
25
0 degrees, 
positive CW
Summary Slide
• RTSM Framework for NAS Safety Monitoring and Prediction
• Airport Surface Operations
• Hazard analysis using NTSB & ASRS databases
• Large number of unpredictable incidents
• Predictable incidents - may be monitored, predicted, and mitigated with relevant 
safety precursors using RTSM framework
• Airport Reconfiguration Problem
• Optimal runway reconfiguration
• Minimize frequency & handle uncertainty 
• Markov Decision Process Framework 
• Prototype implementation - Single runway, two aircraft
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SHM for Satellites
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Developing a conceptual 
prognostics and health 
management (PHM) framework 
for small satellites in swarm 
formations;  enabling predictions 
of possible failure times and the 
remaining useful life of the 
satellite(s), components and 
subsystems;  to ultimately further 
autonomous exploration for space 
and science missions
❏ System Health Monitoring
❏ Prognostic Approaches
❏ Remaining Useful Life RUL Estimation
❏ Current and Future  Space Missions
❏ Goals for Satellite Missions
❏ Satellite and Systems Health Monitoring
❏ Satellite Subsystems
❏ Satellite Subsystems Anomalies and Failures
❏ Attitude and Orbit Control Subsystem
❏ Anomalies and Failures in AOCS
❏ System Health Monitoring and AOCS
❏ PHM Frame work for AOCS
Scope
System Health Monitoring
• Prognostics provides the decision maker an early warning about 
the expected time to system/subsystem/component failure
Data 
acquisition Diagnostics Prognostics
Decision 
Making
Collection 
condition 
monitoring data 
& extract 
features
What is the 
fault and how 
severe is it?
What is the 
remaining 
useful life?
Optimal 
management on 
maintenance and 
logistics
Prognostics 
approaches
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Data driven
Hybrid approach 
Degradation data
+
usage conditions
Physics with physical 
model
Extrapolation with 
mathematical 
function
Degradation data 
(training data) 
AI 
approaches
Statistical 
approaches
Physics based
Data driven
Model 
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Degradation & RUL prediction
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Prognostic Approaches
1. Kim, N.-H., An, D., & Choi, J.-H. (2017). Prognostics and Health Management of Engineering Systems: Springer International Publishing.
Remaining Useful Life RUL Estimation
1. Kim, N.-H., An, D., & Choi, J.-H. (2017). Prognostics and Health Management of Engineering Systems: Springer International Publishing.
RUL Methodologies
Remaining Useful Life 
Estimation Methodology
Model Based
Physical Model
Cumulative Damage
Hazard Rate 
Proportional Hazard 
Rate
Nonlinear Dynamics
Data Driven
Neural Network
Support Vector 
Machine
Bayesian Network
Hidden(Markov, semi 
markov)
Hybrid
Statistical Model
Fourier Transform with 
Neural Network
Statistical Model with 
Neural Network
Fuzzy Logic with 
Neural Network
Wavelet Transform 
Analysis with Statistical 
Model
Dynamic Wavelet with 
Neural Network1. .Ahmadzadeh, F., & Lundberg, J. (2014). Remaining useful life estimation. International Journal 
of System Assurance Engineering and Management, 5(4), 461-474. 
Current and Future  Space Missions
• Categorization of thirty-nine multi-satellite missions based on their mission type, formation type and 
number of satellites
1. Bandyopadhyay, S., Foust, R., Subramanian, G. P., Chung, S.-J., & Hadaegh, F. Y. (2016). Review of formation flying and constellation missions using 
nanosatellites. Journal of spacecraft and rockets. 
2. Bandyopadhyay, S., Subramanian, G. P., Foust, R., Morgan, D., Chung, S.-J., & Hadaegh, F. (2015). A review of impending small satellite formation flying 
missions. Paper presented at the 53rd AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting.
continued
❏ Categorization of thirty-nine multi-satellite missions based on their mission status, leading organization 
and funding source
1. Bandyopadhyay, S., Foust, R., Subramanian, G. P., Chung, S.-J., & Hadaegh, F. Y. (2016). Review of formation flying and constellation missions using 
nanosatellites. Journal of spacecraft and rockets. 
2. Bandyopadhyay, S., Subramanian, G. P., Foust, R., Morgan, D., Chung, S.-J., & Hadaegh, F. (2015). A review of impending small satellite formation flying 
missions. Paper presented at the 53rd AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting.
Goals for Satellite Missions
• The goal of future space missions is autonomy, with the following requirements 
identified in the literature
• Self-requirements 
• self-trajectory 
• self-protection 
• self-scheduling 
• self-reparation 
• Knowledge
• Awareness
• Monitoring
• Adaptability
• Dynamicity
• Robustness
• Resilience
• Mobility
1. Vassev, E., & Hinchey, M. (2014). Autonomy Requirements Engineering for Space Missions: Springer.
Maintenance 
planning
Mission 
Planning 
Etc.
Systems
Decision 
Management
Prognostics
Component 
RUL
Future 
capabilities 
Etc.
Enhanced 
Diagnostics
Preprocessing
Feature 
Extraction
De-noising
Filtering 
Etc.
Signal 
Statistics
Estimated 
parameters
Etc.
Fault status
System 
capabilities
Etc.
Sensor Data
Decisions
Preprocessed 
Data
FeaturesDiagnosis
Remaining 
Useful Life
Satellite and Systems Health Monitoring
1. Fong, C. M., and Hui, S. C. An intelligent online 
machine fault diagnosis system. Computing and 
Control Engineering Journal, Oct. 2001.
Satellite Subsystems
• On-board Data Handling System (OBDH)
• Power System (EPS)
• Communication System - Inter-Satellite Link & Data Downlink and/or Uplink 
(COM)
• Thermal Control System (TCS)
• Structure (MECH)
• Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS)
• Payload (PL)
Satellite Subsystems Anomalies and Failures
1. Tafazoli, M. (2009). A study of on-orbit spacecraft failures. Acta Astronautica, 64(2), 195-205. .
continued
1. Wayer, J. K., Castet, J. F., & Saleh, J. H. (2013). Spacecraft attitude control subsystem: Reliability, multi-state 
analyses, and comparative failure behavior in LEO and GEO. Acta Astronautica, 85, 83-92.
continued
1. Wayer, J. K., Castet, J. F., & Saleh, J. H. (2013). Spacecraft attitude control subsystem: Reliability, 
multi-state analyses, and comparative failure behavior in LEO and GEO. Acta Astronautica, 85, 83-
92.
continued
1. Robertson, B., & Stoneking, E. (2003). Satellite GN & C anomaly 
trends. Advances in the Astronautical Sciences, 113, 531-542. 
SHM for AOCS Subsystem
Attitude and Orbit Control
continued
1. Tafazoli, M. (2009). A study of on-orbit spacecraft failures. Acta Astronautica, 64(2), 195-205.
2. Robertson, B., & Stoneking, E. (2003). Satellite GN & C anomaly trends. Advances in the Astronautical Sciences, 113, 
531-542. 
continued
1. Barua, A., & Khorasani, K. (2011). Hierarchical fault diagnosis and health monitoring in satellites formation flight. IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C (Applications and Reviews), 41(2), 223-239. 
PHM Frame work for AOCS
• Model based prognostics algorithms to predict the remaining useful life of 
AOCS components using a probabilistic approach incorporating the  
uncertainty model for each component to estimate the RUL of the complete 
AOCS system for the satellite.
• This information will be useful for the formation to maintain their position or 
to reconfigure within the estimated time for uninterrupted mission 
deliverables

State 
Estimation
Health Management Approach
Actuator Control 
CommandsPlant (GNC) AOCS Model
Reference 
statistical 
model 
parameters
Fault 
Detection
Useful life 
remaining 
RUL / EOL
Actuator 
Response
Prognostics 
Residual
ModelPrediction
Fault 
identification
Diagnostics
Conclusion
• SHM for small satellites is important for autonomy
• AOCS contributes to about 32% of all on-board failures
• AOCS is a critical component in satellite formation flying
• Telemetry data for deep space missions of small satellite is unavailable
• 84% of all AOCS anomalies and failures are from related to design and 
operations
• ISHM will provide useful information to designers for more robust design
Background
Tafazoli, M. (2009). A study of on-orbit spacecraft 
failures. Acta Astronautica, 64(2-3), 195-205. 
doi:10.1016/j.actaastro.2008.07.019
• Based on NASA’s decadal survey, 
there is a clear need to prioritize the 
development of satellite swarm 
technology for studies of space 
physics and Earth science.
• In order to make deep space 
missions gain autonomy, the 
sources of mission decay and failure 
must be known.
• A survey found that the Attitude and 
Orbit Control Subsystem (AOCS) 
had a high incidence of failure
• This makes the AOCS a great 
candidate for systems health 
management
5
0
What is the AOCS?
❏ This stands for Attitude and Orbit Control 
System, but it may also be called Attitude 
Determination System (ADS) or Attitude 
Determination and Control Subsystem (ADCS).
❏ This is the subsystem that stabilizes the 
spacecraft and orients it in desired directions 
during its operation.
5
1
Scope
Determine component 
for study
Obtain modeling sources
Model nominal 
and faulty operation
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2
Component 
Determination
❏Magnetorquers
❏Reaction Wheels
❏Momentum Wheels
❏Control Momentum Gyros (CMGs)
❏Thrusters
Actuators
5
3
Component 
Determination
❏ Relevance: is it suitable for future satellite 
missions?
❏ History: does the component have records of 
failure?
❏ Benefits: what are the pros of using this 
actuator?
5
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Component 
Determination
❏Magnetorquers
❏Reaction Wheels
❏Momentum Wheels
❏Control Momentum Gyros (CMGs)
❏Thrusters
Actuators
Pointing accuracy
Low energy consumption
Known cause of mission
decay and failure
5
5
Reaction Wheels
❏The Reaction Wheel Assembly 
(RWA) is an actuator which in 
essence consists of a flywheel 
attached to a brushless DC 
motor.
❏They produce a torque that is 
applied to the spacecraft to 
correct its position.
Source: Blue Canyon Technologies
5
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❏A minimum of three reaction 
wheels, one per body axis, is 
required to maintain attitude
❏Reaction wheels are used for 
zero-momentum control or 
momentum-bias control on 
ADCS, which are the two forms 
of three-axis control
From US patent: Onboard attitude 
control using reaction wheelsSource: Blue Canyon Technologies 5
7
Obtain modeling 
sources❏What needed to be determined?
❏ Parameters
❏ Model 
❏ Faults
58
Schematic of an AOCS Actuated 
by RWA
Reaction 
Wheels
Spacecraft 
DynamicsController
Td,external
Φm
θm
ψm
Tc
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ΣΣ
Φc
θc
ψc
Φe,θe,ψe 
Equations
❏ Mechanical:
Tm - Tf + Td  = Jω
❏ Electrical:
VR = VS - Vemf
VR = k∫(ic-im) - kemfω
.Motor torque
Disturbance 
torque
Friction torque
Resistance 
Voltage
Commanded
Voltage
Back EMF
Voltage 60
Parameter Notation Value
Torque constant km 5.88 mNm/A
Back EMF constant kemf 5.89 mNm/A
Inertia of rotor J 1.12x10^-6 kg-m2 
Resistance R 6.67 Ω
Number of poles N 8
Viscous friction coefficient b 5.1965x10-7 Nms
Static Imbalance s 1.2 g-mm
Dynamic Imbalance d 20 g-mm2
Gain k 220 V/A*s
Source: Maxon Motor
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Motor disturbances
❏Torque Ripple: result of 
the drive torque being a 
superposition of rectified 
sine waves. The torque ripple 
of a motor with a greater 
number of poles is at a 
higher frequency, where it is 
less problematic.
❏Cogging torque: is a result 
of the magnets in the rotor 
moving past a ferromagnetic 
    
Markley, F. L. & Crassidis, J.L. (2014). Fundamentals of Spacecraft Attitude Determination and Control, 195-205. Springer.62
❏Cogging torque (f1): where C is the amplitude of the cogging torque, N 
is the number of poles, and ω is the angular speed 
❏Torque Ripple (f2): where B is the amplitude of the cogging torque, N 
is the number of poles, and ω is the angular speed 
Khorasani, K, & Sobhani-Tehrani, E. (2009). Fault Diagnosis of Nonlinear Systems Using a Hybrid Approach. Springer.63
Flywheel Imbalances
❏ Static imbalance: condition that the wheel’s 
center of mass is not on the axis of rotation.
❏ Dynamic imbalance: condition that the axis of 
rotation of the wheel is not on the principal axis.
Markley, F. L. & Crassidis, J.L. (2014). Fundamentals of Spacecraft Attitude Determination and Control, 195-205. Springer.
Shields, J et. al (2017). Characterization of CubeSat Reaction Wheel Assemblies. Journal of Small Satellites, 6(1), 565-580. 
64
Simulation Scenarios
❏Using three different inputs, the following 
scenarios were simulated: 
1. Nominal operation
2. Loss of effectiveness of motor torque: 
kmf1=0.7kmn
3. Voltage disturbance: V_f = 1.5*sin(30*t)
4. Change in friction: including Coulomb friction, 
c=0.00103 65
Simulink Model
Motor Dynamics
Flywheel 
Imbalances
Motor disturbances
66
Nominal Operation
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
Faulty Operation
74
Fault 2:
Voltage 
Disturbance
Fault 1:
Efficiency 
loss
Fault 3:
Increase in 
friction
Fault 4:
Increase in 
current with 
increase in 
friction
75
Fault 1: kmf1=0.7kmn
76
77
78
79
80
81
   
=1.5*sin(30*t)
82
83
84
85
86
87
   
Increase
88
89
90
91
92
93
Fault 4: kmf4=0.7kmn
94
95
96
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Ripple and Cogging
100
Next Steps
❏ Compare with experimental data (testbed 
design)
❏ Include spacecraft dynamics and momentum 
dumping devices to observe further faults
❏ Augmenting model with motor drive electronics
❏ Develop diagnostics and prognostics approach 
(i.e. wheel speed condition, energy consumption, 
etc.)
101
Questions?
❏Thanks for your attention!
Source: NASA/JPL-Caltech
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